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Abstract** 
  
Credit ratings issued by credit rating agencies regulated in Hong Kong are 
serviceable in the European Union (EU) because Hong Kong is recognized for 
these purposes as an equivalent jurisdiction. The perimeter of Hong Kong’s credit 
rating regime has recently come under the scrutiny of the Securities and Futures 
Appeals Tribunal, which has established important boundary lines impacting on 
the authorization, supervision and enforcement of the credit rating industry in 
Hong Kong. This article analyzes the case and identifies four elements central to 
it, namely, the information-based, document-based and act-based perimeters of 
the Hong Kong regime as well as its primary regulatory objective. It is suggested 
that the Tribunal’s approach to these elements may represent a material 
departure of Hong Kong’s legal and supervisory framework from the regime in the 
EU that could adversely affect Hong Kong’s standing as an equivalent jurisdiction. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hong Kong’s legal and supervisory framework for the regulatory oversight of 
credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) was introduced on 1 June 2011 (the “HK 
regime”).1 On 28 April 2014 Hong Kong obtained the EU’s implementing decision 
by which it is regarded as an equivalent jurisdiction for EU purposes (the 
“equivalence decision”).2  
 
Since obtaining equivalence, the question of the precise scope of the HK regime 
has been subject to the scrutiny of the Securities and Futures Commission 
(“SFC”), the statutory regulator, and the Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal 
(“Tribunal”), a statutory body, chaired by a judge, empowered to review specified 
decisions of the SFC.3 The question arose in connection with a report issued by 
Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong Limited (“Moody’s”) shortly after the 
introduction of the HK regime. The report was titled “Red Flags for Emerging-
Market Companies: A Focus on China” (the “Report”), and was available to paying 
subscribers.  
 
Although Moody’s is licensed as a CRA in Hong Kong it did not consider the 
Report to be a credit rating or part of its regulated activities. However, the SFC 
regarded the issuance of the Report as falling within its regulatory oversight and 
imposed on Moody’s a pecuniary penalty of HK$23 million for alleged regulatory 
breaches. Moody’s appealed the matter to the Tribunal, which specifically 
required it to consider the precise scope of the credit rating regulatory regime. 
The Tribunal, in Moody’s Investors Service Hong Kong Limited v Securities and 
Futures Commission (Application No. 4 of 2014), concurred with the SFC‘s finding 
in this regard.4 
 
The case appears to be the first, in Hong Kong or internationally,5 that has 
considered what characteristics of published information or opinion are required 
for that information or opinion to constitute a credit rating for regulatory 
purposes, and what it is to engage in credit rating services. Because CRAs issue a 
variety of reports, many of which are accepted by the industry and regulators as 
business analysis not constituting a credit rating, the case also represents an 
exploration of which reports issued by a licensed CRA should be treated as falling 
within the perimeter of its regulated credit rating activities, and which should not 
be so treated.  
 
It is of particular interest as the implementation of the HK regime closely and 
explicitly followed the approach taken internationally post 2008 and to ensure 
consistency with the EU.6 Meeting the EU’s test of equivalence and/or stringency 
was a central objective of the HK regime to enable credit ratings issued by CRAs 
based in Hong Kong to be serviceable in the EU.7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The new regime became effective on 1 June 2011Securities and Futures Ordinance 
(Amendment of Schedule 5) Notice, L.N. 28 of 2011 
2 The EU’s implementing decision of 28 April 2014 pursuant to Article 5(6) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament. See Official Journal of the European 
Union, vol 57, 3 May 2014, page 76-78. The decision came into effect on 23 May 2014 
3 Established under SFO, Part XI, the Tribunal is chaired by a judge assisted by two 
layperson members. 
4 However, the pecuniary penalty was reduced to HK$11 million 
5 Based on searches using Lexis covering Hong Kong, the UK, all EU member states, US 
Federal courts, Canada and Australia 
6 SFC’s “Consultation Paper Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 19 July 2010, para 3 expressly references the G20 Declaration 
7 SFC’s “Consultation Conclusions Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 29 October 2010, para 4 
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This article analyzes the Tribunal’s determination and considers its relevance to 
Hong Kong’s ongoing status as an equivalent jurisdiction for EU purposes. Section 
2 provides an overview of the HK regime and the Moody’s case. Section 3 
analyzes the determination and identifies four elements central to it, namely, the 
information-based, document-based and act-based perimeters of the Hong Kong 
regime as well as its primary regulatory objective. It is suggested that the 
Tribunal’s approach to these four elements may represent a material departure 
from the CRA regime in the EU that could adversely affect Hong Kong’s standing 
as an equivalent jurisdiction. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Hong Kong and the Moody’s case 
 
2.1 Foundations of the HK regime 
 
The development of the HK regime was a direct product of international 
developments. In the early 2000’s, prompted by high profile corporate collapses, 
the international community began to look more closely at the role of CRAs in the 
financial marketplace and whether they should be subject to regulatory oversight. 
Work undertaken by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) led to IOSCO issuing two 
documents in 2003 concerning the activities of CRAs and the high-level principles 
that should govern them.8 This was followed, in 2004, by IOSCO’s “Code of 
conduct fundamentals for credit rating agencies” (“IOSCO CRA Code”).9 However, 
it was not until the global financial crisis of 2008 that an international consensus 
was formed, the Group of Twenty (“G20”) requiring that “all Credit Rating 
Agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes should be subject to a 
regulatory oversight regime.”10 A number of countries subsequently implemented 
CRA regimes having regard to the foregoing, in particular, the approach taken in 
the IOSCO CRA Code. 
 
In September 2009 the European Union (“EU”) promulgated Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 to regulate CRAs (the “EU regime”). Its stated purposes being, inter 
alia: 
 
“to enhance the integrity, transparency, responsibility, good governance 
and reliability of credit rating activities … [and to lay down] conditions for 
the issuing of credit ratings”.11 
 
The effect of the EU regime was to establish three gateways that permitted the 
use of credit ratings in the EU: ratings issued directly under the EU regime; 
ratings endorsed by CRAs regulated under the EU regime as complying with 
requirements as stringent as in the EU; and ratings issued under an equivalent 
regulatory regime.  
 
The HK regime was designed to benefit from the third of these gateways. As a 
result, there is a high degree of similarity between the HK and EU regimes, albeit 
having been implemented differently owing to their different legal systems.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Report on the activities of credit rating agencies”, and “IOSCO Statement Of Principles 
Regarding The Activities Of Credit Rating Agencies”, both issued in September 2003 
9 The IOSCO CRA Code is updated from time to time, the current version being dated 
March 2015, see IOSCO FR05/2015  
10 "Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy", and the "The 
Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, London" - statements issued by the G20 leaders, 15 
November 2008 and 2 April 2009, respectively 
11 Art 1, Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies 
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The HK regime comprises both statutory and non-statutory components. The 
statutory part is established by the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”)12 
and is based around a concept of regulated activities that closely follow the 
definitions of “credit rating” and “credit rating agency” in Article 3 of the EU 
regime and which requiring licensing. Detailed conduct regulation is set out in 
non-statutory regulation that follows Title II of the EU regime, is expressly based 
on the IOSCO CRA Code,13 and adopts the principles established by IOSCO in its 
“Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies”14 (“IOSCO CRA Principles”). 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority’s (“ESMA”) technical advice 
concluded that “the Hong Kong legal and supervisory framework in respect of 
CRAs is comparable to that laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009”, 15 paving 
the way for the equivalence decision. However, the equivalence decision is not a 
one-off passport. It is subject to three conditions being satisfied on an ongoing 
basis, the first of which requires that CRAs: 
 
“must be subject to authorisation or registration and to effective 
supervision and enforcement on an ongoing basis … On this basis, it 
should be considered that CRAs in Hong Kong are subject to authorisation 
or registration requirements equivalent to those laid down in Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and the Hong Kong supervisory and enforcement 
arrangements applicable to CRAs are effectively applied and enforced.”16 
 
This condition is central to the concerns of this article because the equivalence 
decision was made at a time when no statutory body or Court of law had been 
asked to determine or rule on the precise scope of the HK regime including its 
statutorily defined terms. However, this changed in March 2016 when the 
Tribunal issued its determination on Moody’s Report. 
 
2.2 The Report 
 
The Report comprised a framework in which red flags were assigned to specified 
companies across a range of corporate governance and accounting risk issues. 
The framework comprised 20 red flags grouped into five categories that Moody’s 
described as “screens for governance or accounting risks [that] can help identify 
areas to investigate but cannot serve as mechanisms to rank order credit risk.”17 
The five categories were: 
 
weaknesses in corporate governance; 
riskier or more opaque business models; 
fast-growing-business strategies; 
poorer quality of earnings or cash flow; and 
concerns over auditors and quality of financial statements. 
 
The Report describes the system as identifying “warning signs” for the types of 
companies covered, being 61 Chinese non-financial companies that fall within 
Moody’s ratings horizon as being “high-yield”.18 Six of the companies that had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Chapter 571 
13 SFC CRA Code, para 2, referring to the IOSCO CRA Code in effect at that time 
14 FR04/11 February 2011 
15 Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 2014, page 76 
16 Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 2014, page 76-77 
17 Report page 1 
18 Report page 2 
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triggered between 7 and 12 red flags were identified as “negative outliers”19 and 
were subject to additional comments as to “what risks these flags are 
highlighting.”20  
 
Based on the significant market reaction to the Report, it appeared to be of 
considerable interest to both equity and debt investors.21 The prevailing 
environment of concern of regulators and investors over governance and 
accounting standards in Mainland companies,22 the targeted nature of the report, 
the cautionary note of its red flags, and Moody’s status in the market, together 
contributed to this. 
 
Although Moody’s is licensed as a CRA it did not consider the report to be a credit 
rating or part of its licensed CRA activities. In common with the approach taken 
internationally, the HK regime recognizes the origins of CRAs are historically 
borne out of business analysis and that modern day CRAs can and do issue 
research that amounts to business analysis.23 Accordingly, the HK regime does 
not prohibit a CRA from engaging in ancillary services,24 and applicable 
regulations expressly permit it subject to the requirement that it does not create 
a conflict of interest for its credit rating services.25 This reflects the approach in 
the EU regime.26 It may be noted that the Report had been initiated solely by 
Moody’s and that no conflict issue arose in relation to the Report. 
 
2.3 The Tribunal’s determination 
 
The SFC’s disciplinary action against Moody’s was based on it treating the 
issuance of the Report as falling within its regulatory oversight, and Moody’s 
appeal to the Tribunal argued that as a matter of law it did not. It must here be 
noted that the statutory and non-statutory components of the HK regime must be 
kept distinct. While the sanctions applied by the SFC arose from alleged breaches 
of non-statutory codes, the question of whether or not Moody’s issuance of the 
report is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the SFC requires an examination 
of the empowering legislation, the SFO. Moody’s appeal therefore required the 
Tribunal to interpret the statutory provisions of the SFO defining “credit rating” 
and the extent and scope of “providing credit rating services” (in Hong Kong also 
known as Type 10 regulated activity).  
 
The introduction of the HK regime being relatively new, there is no judicial 
precedent on the matter. Nor does there appear to be any judicial ruling 
internationally that might be of assistance.27 With a view to giving effect to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Report pages 14-15 of Appendix 2 
20 Report page 4 
21 Per the Tribunal, “more than half of the issuers red-flagged in the [Moody’s] Report had 
experienced substantial falls. Four of the six issuers identified in the [Moody’s] Report as 
negative outliers suffered the biggest drops” (Moody’s Case [37]) 
22 The Report cites investigations by the SEC and participants in the markets “are looking 
into potential problems with the quality of financial reporting from publicly listed Chinese 
companies” (page 2). The Tribunal cites a New York Times article posted 26 May 2011 
“The Audacity of Chinese Frauds” (Moody’s Case [18]) 
23 Langohr, op cit page 2 
24 The SFC, in line with international practice, rejected the concept that CRAs should be 
subject to a sole business restriction. See SFC’s 29 October 2010 Consultation 
Conclusions, op cit para 63 
25 Para 30 of the “Code of Conduct for Persons Providing Credit Rating Services”, SFC, June 
2011 (“SFC CRA Code”) 
26 EU regime, Recital (6) 
27 Searches were conducted using Lexis in Hong Kong, the UK, all EU member states, US 
Federal courts, Canada and Australia. Two cases of interest for other reasons were 
identified and these are discussed elsewhere in this paper, namely, Bathurst Regional 
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intention of the Legislature, the Tribunal undertook a purposive interpretation of 
the law that took as its focus the regulated activity of providing credit rating 
services. The core question for its interpretative exercise was: 
 
“[I]n terms of the relevant statutory provisions, did the publication of the 
[Moody’s] Report (of itself) constitute the provision of credit rating 
services? … In determining this issue it is important to note that the 
phrase ‘credit ratings’ is broadly defined.”28 
 
Only if the answer to that question were in the positive would the SFC have 
jurisdiction over Moody’s in relation to the Report. If it were in the negative, then 
the SFC would have no power to impose regulatory penalties in relation to 
Moody’s Report.29 
 
Connecting the red flag framework exclusively and particularly to an opinion on 
creditworthiness is not a straightforward matter. Nowhere in the Report is the red 
flag framework described as identifying creditworthiness per se. Nor does it 
indicate that it has any impact on Moody’s existing rating opinions. The opening 
paragraph of the Report describes the red flag framework as “highlight[ing] 
issues meriting scrutiny to identify possible governance or accounting risks for 
nonfinancial corporate issuers”. Its front page continues that the framework “can 
help identify areas to investigate but cannot serve as mechanisms to rank order 
credit risk”, and that the red flags “do not represent a change in our rating 
methodologies.” Page 4 of the Report states that the correlation between the 
number of red flags and creditworthiness is “limited” – some groupings of 
companies revealing a “lack of correlation”, others showing a “degree of 
correlation”. 
 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal determined the Report to be either (1) itself a credit 
rating or (2) part and parcel of Moody’s ratings themselves.30 It observed that 
more flags represented more warning signs of an increased potential credit risk – 
the number of flags reflecting the level of credit risk – and that this suggested 
greater scrutiny is required by market participants.31 Moreover, it determined 
that red flag framework amounted to a credit rating because it constituted “a 
well-defined system or mechanism for judging levels of credit risk.”32 The 
Tribunal further determined that even if the Report was not itself a credit rating, 
then it is part and parcel of Moody’s ratings because the Report is intended to 
amplify and supplement, and is “intimately attendant upon”, Moody’s credit 
ratings.33 Accordingly, it found that the preparation and issuance of the Report 
fell within the statutory definition of providing credit rating services. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) 3 of 6 (2012) and General 
Electric Capital Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 489 (Tax Court appeal) 
28 Moody’s Case [80-81] 
29 Although not addressed by the Tribunal (due to the scope of its function), the SFC may 
nevertheless have powers in relation to the Report qua information in the marketplace 
under the market misconduct provisions of the SFO. See S. Johnstone, “Credit ratings: The 
Moody’s case”, Hong Kong Law Journal 47(1) 2017, section 4.4 
30 Moody’s Case [102] 
31 Moody’s Case [29], [31], [92] 
32 Moody’s Case [93] 
33 Moody’s Case [102] 
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2.4 Import of the Moody’s case 
 
The powers of the Tribunal are considerable,34 and its determinations are binding 
subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. A failure to comply with its 
orders constitutes a criminal offence.35 However, a determination by the Tribunal 
is technically incapable of affecting the law as a result of the nature of the 
Tribunal insofar as it is a statutory tribunal, not a Court of law part of the Hong 
Kong court system. 
 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal is an important part of Hong Kong’s regulatory 
architecture and system of checks and balances on the exercise of regulatory 
power, and a determination by the Tribunal carries significant weight. While the 
correctness of the Tribunal’s determination has been questioned,36 and Moody’s 
has appealed the decision, the determination does establish important boundary 
lines on the scope of the HK regime that guide both the industry and its regulator 
as to the interpretation and implementation of the CRA regime.37  
 
Although different jurisdictions have provided for similar, though not identical, 
definitions of “credit rating”, aligning the meaning and scope of the term is 
important given the sought-after consistency in the international approach to CRA 
regulation. The alignment of Hong Kong’s statutory use of the term with 
international expectations, fundamental to the origins of the HK regime, is of 
particular relevance in view of the first condition attached to the equivalence 
decision noted above. Viewed from this perspective, if the effect of the Tribunal’s 
determination was to represent a material departure from the understanding of 
ESMA or the European Commission, this may suggest that a generally consistent 
approach has not developed or been maintained in Hong Kong, possibly causing 
Hong Kong’s continued standing as an equivalent jurisdiction to be called into 
question. 
 
One might rephrase the problem more specifically: would the issue of the Report 
be regarded for the purposes of EU regulation as that of a credit rating agency 
issuing a credit rating? If the answer is no, this would appear to confirm a 
problematic equivalence gap exists. This conceivably could require a 
reassessment of Hong Kong’s continued equivalence, placing a central purpose of 
implementing the HK regime at risk of failure. 
 
3. Assessing the determination 
 
The following sections of this article identify four elements central to the 
Tribunal’s interpretation and application of the HK regime, regarding its: 
 
information-based perimeter; 
document-based perimeter;  
act-based perimeter; and 
primary regulatory objective; 
 
The analysis of the Tribunal’s approach to these elements suggests a departure 
from the origins and purposes of the international approach and, in particular, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Including the power under section 218(2) of the SFO to confirm, vary or set aside SFC 
decisions, including the disciplinary powers exercised by the SFC in the Moody’s case. 
35 See generally SFO, Part XI, Division 2 
36 See S. Johnstone, “Credit ratings: The Moody’s case”, op. cit. 
37 Moody’s has since appealed the Tribunal’s determination and this will bring the case 
before the Court of Appeal (see SFO, Part XI, Division 3), a body that is able to establish 
legal precedent 
page 9 / 9 
from the EU regime on which it is closely based. Two of the requirements set out 
in the first condition of the equivalence decision cited above will be relevant to 
consider, namely, the authorization requirements and/or the effective application 
of the supervisory arrangements.  
 
3.1 Information-based perimeter – what constitutes a credit rating? 
 
The Tribunal’s determination in important ways turns on its treatment of the term 
“credit rating”. It noted that credit ratings refer to the risk of debt not being paid 
when due: 
 
“ ‘Credit ratings’ have been described as ‘opinions about relative credit 
risk’ and ‘credit risk’ itself has been described as ‘the potential for loss due 
to failure of a borrower to meet its contractual obligation to repay a debt 
in accordance with the agreed terms’.” 38  
 
This definition, while not incorrect and useful for some purposes, glosses over 
distinctions between “creditworthiness” qua the assessment of credit risk, and 
“credit rating” which refers only to the opinion expressed on creditworthiness. 
The Tribunal did not undertake any detailed analysis of the term “credit rating” 
and regarded it as being  
 
“broadly defined. The Legislature has not condescended to specific 
accountancy directives or mathematical formulae.. … It allows for different 
forms of credit ratings in respect of a range of subject matters. … [and] is 
broadly drafted so as to meet the exigencies of changing circumstances … 
Understandably, therefore, the [SFO] defines ‘credit ratings’ as ‘opinions’, 
that is, as views, judgments or beliefs, without any limitation to their form 
other than that they are ‘expressed’ using a ‘defined rankings system’, 
namely, a system that divides its subject matter into ranks or classes that 
are clearly specified” 39 
 
The following analysis suggests the Tribunal’s approach to a material extent rests 
on a commingling of elements relevant to credit ratings that is at variance with 
the approach of the EU regime to the CRA industry. These elements are: (1) the 
connections and distinctions between credit risk, creditworthiness and the opinion 
expressed on creditworthiness; and (2) the relationship between methodology 
and a rating opinion, in particular, the relevance of a CRA’s methodology to a 
rating opinion once it has been issued. These divergences give rise to the 
possibility of mismatch – that what might be regarded as a credit rating under 
the HK regime might not be regarded as one under EU regime. To better 
appreciate the approach taken by the Tribunal it is first necessary to consider the 
meaning of “credit rating” as generally understood. 
 
Definitions of credit rating 
 
Different jurisdictions have not adopted identical language when implementing 
CRA regimes owing, in part, to differences in legal systems and regulatory 
architectures. However, each of them are closely connected to IOSCO’s definition: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The Tribunal quoting a definition provided by the Global Association of Risk Professionals 
(Moody’s Case [9]) 
39 Moody’s Case [81-83] 
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“’Credit rating’… means an assessment regarding the creditworthiness of 
an entity or obligation, expressed using an established and defined 
ranking system”40  
 
The definition in article 3, 1(a) of the EU regime follows this quite closely: 
 
“an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial 
obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or 
of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred 
share or other financial instrument, issued using an established and 
defined ranking system of rating categories”. 
 
United States laws provides for similar definitions.41  
 
The statutory component of the HK regime provides that credit ratings are: 
 
“opinions, expressed using a defined ranking system, primarily regarding 
the creditworthiness of- (a) a person other than an individual; (b) debt 
securities; (c) preferred securities; or (d) an agreement to provide 
credit”.42 
 
It will be noted that the Hong Kong legislation incorporates two requirements that 
do not appear in the other definitions above, namely, that the opinion must be 
“expressed using a defined ranking system” and be “primarily regarding” 
creditworthiness. That this language is different from the EU regulation does not 
of itself appear to be significant as it remains the same as when the equivalence 
decision was made by the European Commission. 
 
The Tax Court of Canada provides one of the few judicial statements of 
relevance:  
 
“In general, a credit rating is a credit rating agency's opinion of the 
general creditworthiness of an obligor, or the creditworthiness of an 
obligor with respect to a particular debt security or other financial 
obligation, based on relevant risk factors.” 43 
 
That statement is in general alignment with the definitions reviewed above.  
 
Relationship between credit ratings and creditworthiness 
 
In each of the foregoing definitions, a credit rating involves some form of opinion 
or assessment on creditworthiness being expressed. “Creditworthiness” is not 
defined in either the HK regime or the EU regime. It is to be distinguished from 
“credit rating”. Credit ratings are not themselves the creditworthiness - the credit 
rating, being an opinion on creditworthiness, points to creditworthiness. The 
rating is the signifier, creditworthiness the signified. That relationship is normally 
confined by a set of ranked symbols or icons by which a CRA seeks to facilitate a 
shared or common understanding of what meaning each rating is intended to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 IOSCO CRA Code, op cit page A-4 
41 Exchange Act, s 3(a)(60) provides “The term ‘credit rating’ means an assessment of the 
creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with respect to specific securities or money 
market instruments. 15 USC 78c (a)(60) provides “The term ‘credit rating’ means an 
assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with respect to specific 
securities or money market instruments.”  
42 SFO, Schedule 5, Part 2 
43 General Electric Capital Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 489 (Tax Court 
appeal) at 49 
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convey. This is not only long standing industry practice but is also required by the 
HK regime and the EU regime.44 
 
The approach not to define “creditworthiness” is consistent with international 
practice45 and suggests the word be given its ordinary meaning: the extent to 
which a person is considered suitable for financial credit.46 Creditworthiness thus 
involves a consideration of what acceptable credit risk means. The subjectivity of 
“acceptability” can be contrasted with other factors relevant to credit risk, such as 
debt-to-income ratio and collateral, which are quantifiable. 
 
Credit risk is generally recognized as representing “the capacity and willingness of 
a debtor to meet its obligations when due.”47 This involves elements of subjective 
judgment in the assessment of risk that go beyond merely evaluating the 
relationship between an issuer’s resources and financial performance and its 
capacity to pay.  
 
The Report 
 
Applying the foregoing considerations to the Report, it is clear the red flags do 
cover elements relevant to credit risk assessment, for example, quality of cash 
flow generation and deviations in working capital. However, each flag clearly is 
not an opinion on creditworthiness. They operate in a simple binary manner. 
Either the specific criterion is met and a red flag raised, or it is not and no flag is 
raised. This reflects the distinction between elements that might be pertinent to 
forming an assessment of creditworthiness, and a rating of creditworthiness that 
might or might not emerge from those elements. As noted above, the Report 
does not on its face appear to express an opinion on or be primarily concerned 
with creditworthiness and the language of the report on a plain reading appears 
to eschew a connection between the red flag framework and creditworthiness. 
 
The Tribunal’s assessment of the Report 
 
This analysis can now return to the two points prefaced above, which suggested 
the Tribunal’s approach to a material extent rests on a commingling of certain 
elements relevant to credit ratings at variance with the approach of the EU 
regime. 
 
As regards (1) above (connections and distinctions between credit risk, 
creditworthiness and the opinion expressed on creditworthiness), the Tribunal 
views the Report as constituting a credit rating precisely because it comprised a 
system for judging levels of credit risk.48 This effectively amounts to a view on 
the relationship between credit risk, creditworthiness and the opinion on 
creditworthiness that in some sense reverses IOSCO’s definition of credit ratings 
into: credit ratings are assessments of credit risk that produce a defined ranking 
system. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The SFC CRA Code requires a CRA to “clearly define a given rating symbol and apply it 
in a consistent manner”, para 54. Annex 1, Section D(2)(c) of the EU regime requires the 
meaning of rating categories to be explained when presenting a credit rating 
45 Papers issued by IOSCO do not define ‘creditworthiness’ nor does legislation in the EU, 
US, Japan, Australia or Mexico. For example, see 15 USC 78c 
46 Oxford English Dictionary Third Edition 2013 
47 Q Liiu, P Lejot and DW Arner, “Finance in Asia” (Routledge 2013) 217 
48 Per the Tribunal: “the red flag framework constituted a well-defined system or 
mechanism for judging levels of credit risk and, as such, constituted a credit rating” 
(Moody’s Case [93]) 
page 12 / 12 
The Tribunal’s position stands in contrast to the position in the EU where a credit 
rating essentially requires the expression of a CRA’s opinion of how likely an 
issuer is to repay, the Commission of the European Communities having stated 
that when a CRA issues an opinion on creditworthiness “they assess the likelihood 
that an issuer will default”.49 As the Report only flags elements relevant to an 
assessment of credit risk, it is doubtful it could be regarded as capable of 
amounting to a credit rating as such term is understood in the EU regime. That it 
is so treated under the HK regime represents an important potential equivalence 
gap that goes to a central concern of the CRA regime. 
 
As regards (2) above (relationship between methodology and a rating opinion), 
the alternative view of the Tribunal is that the red flag framework comprised in 
the Report was relevant to Moody’s methodological approach to rating50 and as 
such it amplifies, supplements and becomes part and parcel of Moody’s ratings.51 
 
The Tribunal’s willingness to allow methodology to have an ex post facto influence 
on a published credit rating presents another additional equivalence gap problem. 
Article 10(2) and Annex I, Section D of the EU regime, which specifies the 
requirements on the presentation of credit rating, indicates a clear distinction is 
to be drawn between the rating opinion expressed and the methodology used to 
produce it. This reflects the generally understood meaning of a credit rating that 
it is comprised in, as per the Federal Court of Australia in Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd, “a system of stand alone 
ratings where the relevant information for an investor [is] contained in the rating 
itself and the accompanying definition [the CRA] assigned to the rating.”52 That is 
to say the rating system is the defined scale (of AAA, AA, etc) - it is not 
comprised in the CRA’s methodology or in any allocation of markers (such as red 
flags) that might be relevant to the CRA’s methodology. These distinctions, 
between the methodology, the ranking system, and the opinion expressed, also 
mean that once a rating has been given it “is not dependent on [the CRA’s] 
explanation of how it reached the rating.”53 
 
Non-ratings that might be regarded as credit ratings 
 
The approach of the Tribunal in these regards gives rise to a further point of 
potential variance from the EU regime. It seems possible under the Tribunal’s 
rendering of the HK regime that a report issued by an information provider 
(whether or not a licensed CRA) could be regarded as a credit rating 
notwithstanding that the report lacks certain features generally ascribed to credit 
ratings. That creditworthiness is not the primary concern of the report appears 
not to be determinative, however, a discussion of factors pertaining to credit risk 
might be. This could lead to a grey area in which certain research reports and 
business analyses that are not normally regarded as credit ratings elsewhere, 
including the EU, might be regarded as subject to the HK regime. Persons 
engaging in the provision of information services might be particularly exposed 
and may need to consider whether they are engaging in activities covered by the 
HK regime in a way they would not need to consider if they were engaging in the 
same activities under the EU regime.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Commission of the European Communities, 2005, Communication from the Commission 
on credit rating agencies, December 23, 2005/11990, 1–9, page 2. See also the Report On 
The Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, IOSCO, Statement of the Technical Committee of 
IOSCO, September 2003 
50 Moody’s Case [21]. Also refer to Moody’s Case [153] 
51 Moody’s Case [102] 
52 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd. (No 5) [2012] 
FCA 1200 (Federal Court of Australia) [1465] 
53 Ibid  [1464] 
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Moreover, as will be reviewed next, the Tribunal’s application of the HK regime 
means that matters outside the four corners of a document may be considered to 
determine if published information constitutes, or affects previously issued, credit 
rating opinions. Together, this creates some uncertainty as to what will be treated 
as research product and what falls into the special category of credit rating. 
 
3.2 Document-based perimeter – what else is relevant? 
 
The Tribunal reached its determination not through an isolated examination of the 
contents of Report per se but via a review of various surrounding circumstances. 
Matters it considered outside the four sides of the Report included: Moody’s 
intended purposes54 in issuing the report, the genesis of the report including 
Moody’s internal communications, processes, and expectations,55 the subsequent 
effect of the report in the equity and debt markets,56 and the press release issued 
the day the report was issued.57 
 
As already noted, the process by which a credit rating is produced, including the 
integrity of the rating process and the role of the CRA’s board and its employees 
in that process, is dealt with by both the HK regime and the EU regime, albeit in a 
different structural manner. Whereas this is dealt with in Title II of the EU 
regime, the HK regime deals with these matters by way of the non-statutory SFC 
CRA Code.  
 
Title II and the SFC CRA Code both presume the undertaking of a credit rating 
activity. The language of the relevant provisions takes the existence of a credit 
rating (albeit one that is under production) as a starting point. For example, art 
6(1) of the EU regime requires that a credit rating be not affected by existing or 
potential conflicts of interest.58 As discussed in section 3.4 below, the objective of 
these provisions is directed to the quality of the rating production process and as 
such only appears relevant to apply to the production of information that is 
otherwise treated under the relevant regime as a credit rating.  
 
The language of these provisions is not designed to be determinative of whether 
credit rating activity is being undertaken. Nor do they contain any indication that 
the undertaking of these responsibilities, or the beliefs or expectations of 
management or employees, are relevant to the separate question of whether an 
item of information is a credit rating.  
 
However, the different legal structure of the HK regime and EU regime may be 
relevant as regards what matters may be permissible to take into account when 
determining what is a credit rating. The EU regime deals with both the definition 
of a credit rating and matters related to its production and issuance in a single 
piece of regulation.59 In contrast, the statutory component of the HK regime is 
only concerned with what a credit rating is and the fact of its issuance - the 
details of how it has been produced is handled by the non-statutory provisions of 
the SFC CRA Code, which do not bind statutory interpretation. This distinction 
leaves open a technical possibility that the Hong Kong statute could be subject to 
interpretation in way that might be subject to different considerations in the EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Moody’s Case [19, 21, 66, 93, 100-101, 152, 102, 130, 147, 193, 214] 
55 Moody’s Case [124 to 133] 
56 Moody’s Case [3, 18, 29, 37, 42, 193, 214] 
57 The press release can be found here (last accessed May 2016) 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Accounting-and-governance-warning-signs-
for-emerging-market-companies--PR_222323 
58 EU regime, art 6(1) 
59 In Title I and Title II respectively 
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regime where both matters are constrained by the same piece of regulation. 
Certainly, the Tribunal has regarded aspects of the production process of the 
Report, such as intent, as relevant to the scope of application of the statutory 
component of the HK regime. In this regard it is notable that the Tribunal when 
interpreting the scope of the HK regime did not find the need to consider the non-
statutory SFC CRA Code – under the EU regime it would be difficult to ignore the 
provisions of Title II when considering Title I. 
 
Intent plays a very specific role under both the EU regime60 and the statutory 
part of the HK regime.61 In both, the question of intent prima facie appears to 
apply only to the intended scope of issuance of information that constitutes a 
credit rating. It is clear from the language of the EU regime that intent in this 
regard is directed at carving out reports that are not intended for public 
consumption, and this is also reflected in the exemptions provided in the 
statutory component of the HK regime. However, the Tribunal considers intent as 
being relevant beyond the mere question of issuance and indeed relevant to the 
nature of the information itself qua credit rating. That approach does not rule out, 
and possibly has the unintended implication, that a Type 10 licensed person (or 
perhaps any person) might in fact be regarded as subject to the HK regime if 
they intended to prepare for issue a credit rating even if what was prepared and 
issued was not in fact a credit rating. This seems not possible within the EU 
regime. 
 
The statutory wording that defines the HK regime also has not prevented the 
Tribunal from considering the effect of the Report on the price of equity and debt 
securities issued by companies the subject of the report, or commentary on the 
report by intermediaries and the media. Market reaction appears to be regarded 
by the Tribunal as evidence relevant to determining the nature of the Report. 
Nowhere in the EU regime do such considerations appear to be of any relevance. 
 
The Tribunal also cites the press release Moody’s issued the day the Report was 
published as relevant to an understanding of “the nature and purpose”62 of the 
Report. It forms part of the means by which the Tribunal considered Moody’s to 
have engaged in Type 10 regulated activity when it issued the Report because it 
regarded the press release as conditioning readers in such a way as to influence 
their reading and understanding of the Report. While this appears to arise from 
the Tribunal’s purposive approach to legislative interpretation, it represents an 
expansion of what documentary material is relevant to consider for the purposes 
of defining the scope of the HK regime. It might also be pointed out that this 
would have consequences as to the understanding of what is a credit rating 
(discussed in section 3.1 above) since it would seem to allow that a rating opinion 
may be spread across more than a single document. 
 
The EU regime does contemplate the role of press releases and other reports – 
CRAs are required to issue them to explain the key elements underlying a credit 
rating that is being announced.63 The HK regime also provides for this,64 however, 
as the requirement is only contained in non-statutory regulations, for the reasons 
explained above this gives technical leeway for legislative interpretation in Hong 
Kong that may be constrained in the EU. Indeed, the Tribunal’s application of the 
HK regime gives a role to the press release that might be difficult to reach under 
the EU regime. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 EU regime, art 2(2)(a), Recital (19) 
61 Definition of “providing credit rating services” in SFO, Schedule 5, Part 2 
62 Moody’s Case [19] 
63 EU regime, Annex I, Section D, para 5 
64 SFC CRA Code, para 55 
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A plain reading of the language in the EU regime, including its recitals, does not 
indicate that extrinsic factors such as those considered by the Tribunal are 
relevant to the nature of a report for the purposes of determining whether it is 
subject to the EU regime. In the absence of any EU ruling, it is not possible to 
state with certainty whether the EU regime is intended to encompass such 
extrinsic factors. However, it is notable that important foundations of the EU 
regime, such as the IOSCO CRA Principles and the IOSCO CRA Code, do not make 
any reference to extrinsic factors being of any relevance in these regards. 
 
As already noted, although the language and structure of the HK regime is not 
identical to the EU regime, it is nevertheless sufficiently the same for the 
purposes of the equivalence decision. However, it is certainly possible that 
subsequent interpretations or applications of the HK regime may result in 
discrepancies arising between the two regimes. Indeed, IOSCO has noted that 
discrepancies between different CRA regimes may arise as they are implemented 
and applied.65 
 
3.3 Act-based perimeter – what acts are regulated?   
 
As noted in section 2.3 above, the Tribunal took as its primary focus the 
regulated activity of providing credit rating services as it regarded the phrase 
“credit rating” as being broadly defined. That focus meant the Tribunal was also 
concerned to establish what acts of a CRA should fall within the HK regime and so 
be subjected to the SFC’s regulatory oversight. In doing so, the Tribunal was 
effectively determining an important act-based perimeter of the HK regime. The 
following analysis suggests that the approach of the Tribunal is possibly wider 
than what is contemplated by the EU regime. 
 
The primary constraint around the definition of Type 10 regulated activity appears 
to be that a credit rating must be prepared for dissemination or distribution. By 
implication, it would appear not to be the case that all activities of Type 10 
licensed persons are regulated – only the activities of CRAs that concern the 
credit ratings it prepares for dissemination or distribution are. This seems 
consistent with the objectives of the CRA regime as understood internationally.66 
 
However, the Tribunal when considering this issue took an approach that was 
based not on the HK regime per se but was instead based on the SFC’s statutory 
powers to discipline regulated intermediaries, which includes licensed CRAs. 
Section 194 of the SFO empowers the SFC to impose discipline where a regulated 
intermediary has engaged in misconduct, which includes any  
 
“act or omission relating to the carrying on of any regulated activity …  
which, in the opinion of the [SFC], is or is likely to be prejudicial to the 
interest of the investing public or to the public interest” (emphasis 
added).67 
 
The Tribunal regarded the phrase as having a broad meaning68 and, since the 
Tribunal’s position was that the Report is connected to Moody’s existing ratings, 
the Tribunal was of the view that the act of publishing the Report was an act 
relating to those earlier ratings.69 While the Tribunal did not provide further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 IOSCO CRA Principles, page 38 
66 See section 1 above 
67 SFO, s 193(1)(d) 
68 Moody’s Case [106] 
69 Moody’s Case [106] 
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guidance on the scope of the phrase “relating to”, it is nevertheless clear that the 
Tribunal’s approach captures a wider group of acts than those contemplated by 
the SFC CRA Code, not least because the matters relevant to the Tribunal’s 
determination are not addressed by that code.70 This is notable because the SFC 
CRA Code, which was central to implementing the HK regime to address acts 
involved in the credit rating process, is closely and purposely aligned with the EU 
regime – there is a high degree of conformity of the provisions of the SFC CRA 
Code to the EU regime.71 
 
This suggests that the effective scope of the HK regime, when understood 
through the lens of other applicable provisions of Hong Kong’s regulatory 
architecture, may be wider than the EU regime. This seems unproblematic as 
regards the equivalence decision insofar as acts of CRAs regulated in the EU 
would nevertheless appear to remain regulated in Hong Kong. 
 
However, a wider regime also implies that some acts of CRAs subject to 
regulatory oversight in Hong Kong would not be regarded as subject to the EU 
regime if the same acts were undertaken in the EU. While this may cover a range 
of acts, a specific example of this discrepancy may be ancillary services. 
 
Both the EU regime and the HK regime contemplate ancillary services being 
undertaken by regulated CRAs.72 The EU regime specifically excludes them from 
being part of credit rating activities.73 The EU regime provides that ancillary 
services “comprise market forecasts, estimates of economic trends, pricing 
analysis and other general data analysis as well as related distribution services”.74 
In the United States, ancillary services means “products and services other than 
credit ratings”.75 The HK regime is silent as to the scope of ancillary services. 
 
The EU regime expressly recognizes that credit rating agencies should also be 
able to perform ancillary activities provided only that it does not create conflicts 
of interest or independence concerns.76 Accordingly, ancillary services would only 
become relevant to consider if they create concerns about the integrity of the 
rating. While that is also the case in Hong Kong, the Tribunal’s determination in 
effect means there is an additional circumstance where an ancillary service may 
be relevant to, and indeed would become subject to, the HK regime, namely, if 
the ancillary service is construed as “relating to” credit rating services. Given the 
broad meaning attributed to that phrase by the Tribunal, the scope of this could 
be difficult to specify. 
 
To the extent this differs from the imperative and permissive language in the EU 
this may in effect restrain the EU concept insofar as the HK regime may subject 
some ancillary services to regulatory oversight in a manner that the EU regime 
would not. This could potentially represent an equivalence gap on the basis that 
article 6 of the EU regime requires that an equivalence decision is premised on 
the requirements of the third jurisdiction being “equivalent to the requirements 
resulting from” the EU regime. ESMA’s technical advice that the HK regime was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The SFC General Code was relevant to the Tribunal’s determination, however, that code 
applies to all persons licensed or registered by the SFC and is not specific to CRAs 
71 In particular, Title II of the EU regime 
72 EU regime, Annex I, Section B, para 4, and SFC CRA Code, para 30 
73 EU regime, Annex I, Section B, para 4 
74 EU regime, Annex I, Section B, para 4 
75 SEC, 17 CFR Parts 232, 240, 249, and 249b, Release No. 34-72936; File No. S7-18-11, 
RIN 3235-AL15, page 24 
76 EU regime, Recital (6); see also EU regime, Recital (22) and Annex I, Section B, para 4 
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comparable to the EU regime “in its outcomes”77 might not still be the case when 
considering a CRA’s other activities and the requirements they are subject to 
when performing them in Hong Kong. 
 
The lack of a clear perimeter between which acts of a CRA are regarded as 
“relating to” its credit rating services and so subject to regulatory oversight, and 
which are not are a source of further concern. Although the line between 
regulated and non-regulated acts should be a fundamental one to draw, this 
appears to be uncertain under the Tribunal’s rendering of the HK regime given 
the absence of regulatory guidance on the matter. This could raise doubt over 
whether the HK regime remains such that the powers of regulators and 
responsible authorities can be exercised in a transparent, fair and equitable 
manner, as required by Principle 6.5 of IOSCO’s “Objectives and principles of 
securities regulation”.78 If so, it may become necessary to consider whether the 
supervisory requirements of the HK regime can be “effectively applied”, as 
required by the first condition of the equivalence decision. 
 
3.4 Regulatory objective – what is the primary purpose? 
 
When implementing CRA regulatory oversight, the approach internationally has 
been to use regulatory definitions that build on each other, namely, a definition of 
“credit rating” and a definition of “credit rating agency”. Different jurisdictions 
have implemented CRA regulation in a way that fits into their own legal and 
regulatory architecture but nevertheless achieves sufficient consistency with the 
approach internationally. This includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the EU, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, and the United States.79. In Hong Kong, the 
means by which credit ratings were brought under regulatory oversight was via 
the statutory creation of Type 10 regulatory activity.80  
 
The analysis in this section suggests that the primary concern of CRA regulation 
internationally is the quality of credit ratings and that the Tribunal’s primary focus 
on Type 10 regulated activity in effect causes the originating objectives of CRA 
regulation to be viewed from the wrong end of the telescope, resulting in 
consequential discrepancies from the approach in the EU regime. 
 
A different starting point from the one taken by the Tribunal might have been to 
undertake a close examination of the statutorily defined term “credit rating” and 
apply it to the Report to determine if its issuance constituted the provision of a 
credit rating service. This reflects the hierarchy of terms defined by the SFO, 
which provides that Type 10 regulated activity comprises “preparing credit 
ratings… for dissemination to the public… or… for distribution by subscription”.81 
Credit rating services would therefore only seem capable of being undertaken in 
respect of reports that are credit ratings. Accordingly, the first matter that would 
seem to require consideration is whether an item of information is or is not a 
credit rating – only if it is would it seem relevant to consider the requirements 
attaching to Type 10 regulated activity. 
 
Beginning with a consideration of whether the nature of information amounts to a 
credit rating is consistent with the international context being primarily concerned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Equivalence decision, Recital (2), Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 
2014, page 76 
78 May 2003 
79 See IOSCO CRA Principles, page 38; Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 57 3 
May 2014 
80 An approach similar to the NRSRO system in the U.S. in which CRAs are recognized by 
the relevant authorities – see Arner et al, op cit 369 
81 SFO, Schedule 5, Part 2 
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with the quality of credit ratings. The means by which the G20 envisaged the 
“transparency and quality of the rating process” would be safeguarded was via “a 
regulatory oversight regime that includes registration” consistent with the IOSCO 
CRA Code.82 The IOSCO CRA Code is based on the four principles set out in the 
IOSCO CRA Principles, three of which also take as their primary concern the 
credit rating: 
 
the first principle, quality and integrity in the rating process, takes as its 
objective that opinions should help reduce information asymmetries; 
 
the second principle is that rating decisions should be independent and 
free from conflicts of interest; 
 
the third principle is that ratings activities should be timely and 
transparent.83 
 
The recitals to the EU regime also confirm the objective of the regulation is to 
ensure that credit ratings used in the Community are “independent, objective and 
of adequate quality”84 and to lay down a common framework addressing the 
quality of credit ratings.85 Article 1 of the EU regime indicates that regulatory 
oversight of CRAs is merely the means of enhancing the reliability and quality of 
credit ratings issued in the Community and that important means of doing to are 
to enhance the integrity, transparency, responsibility and good governance of 
CRAs including through independence and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
This notably does not take as its primary concern the activities of CRAs per se, 
but only to those comprised in the analysis, evaluation, approval, issuing and 
review of credit ratings.86 In brief, CRA conduct only appears to be relevant 
insofar as it concerns the quality of the credit ratings a CRA issues. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The foregoing analysis of the Tribunal’s determination has suggested the 
Tribunal’s interpretation and application of the HK regime may be at variance with 
the EU regime along four main axes: the information, documentary and act based 
perimeters of the CRA regime as well as its primary regulatory objective. The 
regulatory objective may have shifted such that there is a different emphasis on 
the acts of CRAs. Closely connected to the foregoing, the requirements for 
information to be treated as a credit rating appear to have become broader and 
less specific. This includes the range of matters that can be taken into account in 
determining the nature, or effect, of information that may be credit-related. The 
range of acts undertaken by CRAs that are subject to the HK regime appears to 
be wider, and less certain in scope.  
 
The Tribunal’s standing in Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture requires that the 
regulator and the industry be guided by its determination accordingly. In practice, 
this means that a certain matters could be treated as falling within the HK regime 
when they would not be so treated in the EU, for example: an item of information 
being treated as a credit rating; an item of methodological information being 
regarded as affecting a credit rating that has previously been issued; an act of a 
CRA being treated as part of its regulated CRA activities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 G20 Declaration, op cit 
83 Emphasis added. The fourth principle is concerned with the handling of confidential 
information 
84 EU regime, Recital (1) 
85 EU regime, Recital (75) 
86 EU regime, art 3(1)(o) 
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Given these examples are not minor variances but strike at central concerns of 
CRA regulation, this suggests an equivalence gap may have opened up which 
could raise concerns over Hong Kong’s continued status as an equivalent 
jurisdiction. The present hiatus in this regard is that Moody’s has appealed the 
Tribunal’s determination to the Court of Appeal. The appeal allows the Court to 
review the determination and to correct any failure or mistake the Tribunal has 
made. A relevant factor for the Court of Appeal to consider will be the purposes of 
introducing the HK regime and an important factor in this regard is that the 
design and implementation of the HK regime was to ensure that it would meet 
the EU’s test of equivalence and/or stringency so that credit ratings issued by 
CRAs based in Hong Kong are serviceable in the EU. The analysis in this paper 
therefore suggests the Court of Appeal may need to consider whether aspects of 
the Tribunal’s approach, if upheld, could place Hong Kong’s status as an 
equivalent jurisdiction in doubt. Unlike the Tribunal’s determination, the Court’s 
ruling will establish law. A binding Court ruling that supports any equivalence gap 
implicit in the Tribunal’s determination may be a matter the European 
Commission is obliged to consider. 
 
The problem is not exclusively related to the EU context. The introduction of CRA 
regulation globally has been part of an international effort that seeks to provide a 
uniform approach to CRA regulatory oversight. IOSCO has noted that as CRA 
regulatory programs are implemented, it will be important for supervisors to keep 
under review the effectiveness of those programs, in particular, whether the 
program gives rise to cross-border conflicts for CRAs.87 To the extent such a 
conflict between regimes exists, Hong Kong regulators and policymakers should 
note that IOSCO requires that they “seek timely and reasonable accommodations 
so long as the IOSCO principles are not compromised.”88 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 IOSCO, FR04/11 February 2011, page 38 op cit 
88 Ibid. 
